Educating Europe by Panu Poutvaara
Educating Europe
Panu Poutvaara¤
Centre for Economic and Business Research (CEBR)
January 21, 2003
Abstract
Themobility oflaborreducesnational incentivestoinvest in internationally applica-
ble education. Such e¤ects may be especially severe for the prospective new member
states of the European Union. The European Union could overcome this by allowing
countries to institute graduate taxes or income-contingent loans, collected also from
migrants. This paper presents calculations on how such a system could look like for
Finland, as well as discusses its implementation. Such contracts could be voluntary,
education …nanced publicly only for those accepting also to share the returns. With
EU enlargement, such reforms could generate a triple dividend.
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11. Introduction
Few forces have shaped, and continue to shape, the world as much as migration. Dur-
ing the second half of the 20th century, Western Europe transformed from being a prime
source of emigrants leaving for a better life in other continents to a lucrative destination.
Migration ‡ows improve overall e¢ciency andmay generate vast e¢ciency gains, when based
on productivity di¤erences. Simultaneously, migration also sets European systems of social
protection in jeopardy.1 More surprisingly, even migration based on productivity di¤erences
may reduce e¢ciency in a dynamic setting as it reduces national incentives to …nance inter-
nationally applicable education. There are three separate, but often interlinked, reasons for
this. First of all, the government has to invest in the education of the young before they
decide where to live, work, and pay taxes after graduation. The expected returns to the
government are lower the higher the probability that the student emigrates. Secondly, each
government faces a temptation to free-ride, especially concerning expensive science-based
…elds of study. Instead of educating future professionals itself, the government may aim to
attract those educated elsewhere by cutting taxes. There are no similar disincentives in,
say, educating lawyers due to degrees in law being much more country-speci…c. Thirdly,
increased mobility of professionals increases the marginal cost of public funds collected from
them.
Some observers would welcome a reduced public …nancing of higher education. It would
be hard to justify taxing low-income citizens to …nance education for those who enjoy in
1Borjas (1987) analyzes self-selection of immigrants to the United States and its economic e¤ects. For an
extensive overview on the economics of immigration, see Borjas (1994).
2average high income in future, they argue. They suggest that a better solution would be
to o¤er student loans in order to solve borrowing constraints. There are, however, several
justi…cations for not relying only on student loans. An obvious one are external e¤ects
when di¤erent factors are complementary. Public provision of education also implements
risk-sharing among students. Eaton and Rosen (1980) and Sinn (1995) prove that income
redistribution may increase e¢ciency with a missing private insurance market. Ordinary
student loans tend to deter applicants from disadvantaged backgrounds. Therefore, they
waste talent andare inequitable by reducing intergenerational mobility. (Bennett et al. 1992,
Barr 1993). There are four alternatives to maintain the current level of public …nancing
of education in the European Union. One is taxing immobile tax bases to …nance the
education of high-skilled professionals, whose tax burden would be eroded in international
tax competition. This would imply regressive redistribution, as shown by Wildasin (2000).
The second alternative, the centralization of decision-making of education, would lead to
excessive harmonization, and is ruled out by the subsidiarity principle. This paper suggests
two new alternatives. They are introducing graduate taxes or introducing income-contingent
loans, both paid according to the same rules independently of future domicile.
The introduction of graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be a part of a
wider reform of the European welfare state. Fölster (1997) and Sørensen (forthcoming) have
suggested …nancing consumption smoothing over active lifetime using individual saving ac-
counts, while Richter (2002) suggests that migrants should be integrated into the income
redistribution system of their new home country only after a delay. Combining these ideas
3would suggest establishing a system of individual accounts with delayed integration, in which
migrants would make mandatory contributions and receive bene…ts according to the system
of their earlier home country for a transition period, while the remaining balance would be
transferred to the system of the new home country after the delay. There are strong reasons
to have a separate account for …nancing education, most notably the frontloading ofthe costs
of investment in education and …nancing education being an investment in future productive
capacity instead of consumption smoothing. Together, these reforms would considerably
limit tax competition without imposing harmonization. They would also favor the establish-
ment of a well-functioning European market for education. For example, governments could
…nd it attractive to …nance education for their own citizens also when these study abroad,
or o¤er education also for students from other member states in exchange for receiving from
them graduate taxes or repayments of income-contingent loans.
Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom have adopted income-contingent loan
schemes where maximum repayment is limited to loan and interest, whereas low-income
workers pay back less than the full loan. Such a system requires, however, general tax
revenue to subsidize low-income workers.2 Also Sweden had a system of income-contingent
loans, in e¤ect between 1989 and 2001. The repayment rate was four percent of total income
if living in Sweden and a yearly amount if living abroad. Loans taken after June 2001 are
ordinary annuity loans. (CNS 2002). Sweden abandoning its income-contingent loan system
2For an analysis of the Australian Higher Education Contribution Scheme, see Chapman (1997). García-
Peñalosa and Wälde (2000) compare the e¢ciency and equity e¤ects of alternative ways of …nancing higher
education. They argue that, with uncertainty, the graduate tax is a better solution than student loans,
student loans whose repayment is conditional on future revenue, or relying on general tax revenue.
4may re‡ect the pressuresofincreasedlabor mobility. Unlikeincome-contingentloans, annuity
loans do not require co-operation from foreign tax authorities. Of all of those who graduate
from Swedish universities, 15 percent emigrate. (Eklund 1998). Due to wide income gaps,
migration ‡ows from the prospective new EU member states to the current states could be
both larger and more permanent. In 2001, GDP per capita at purchasing power parity in the
prospective newmember states was only 46 percent ofEU average. It ranged from 33 percent
in Latvia to 70 percent in Slovenia and 74 percent in Cyprus, being 40 percent in Poland,
the largest prospective new member state.3 (Eurostat 2002). For comparison, Spanish GDP
was 70 percent and Portuguese 50 percent of the then average of old member states when
they joined. (Richter 2002). The potential brain drain could have dire consequences to the
incentives that the new member states face in …nancing their education. Such a concern has
so far been largely neglected at the expense of the fear of negative consequences of "welfare
tourism" to the current member states.
Also Poutvaara (2000, 2001) suggests …nancing income redistribution for students from
taxes collected from them, independently of their future domicile. There is only one type
of human capital, equally applicable everywhere, and ex ante identical students decide on
their own investment in education. This paper has a di¤erent focus. Young people have
di¤erent abilities, and there are several forms of human capital. Di¤erent types of education
are allowed to have di¤erent degrees of international applicability, and education is provided
by the government. This is, indeed, the case for the majority of young people in European
3Data for Malta is not available.
5countries. Governments are a major source of funding for universities, as well as a¤ect the
type of education provided. Indeed, the government may even choose the type of education
to limit mobility.4 Graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be used to …nance
also other types than university education given to adults. In that case, tax rates could be
di¤erentiated according tothe type of education received. The focus is on education targeted
to young adults. In the spirit of Tiebout (1956), parents valuing education may buy better
education for their children by paying higher taxes. Such a mechanism is much weaker in
higher education, as young adults may go to a university in a di¤erent city, or even country,
than in which their parents pay taxes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model of how the
government invests in education of its young citizens without the mobility of labor. Section
3 studies how the government decides on investment in education with labor mobility when
the emigrants pay their wage taxes only to their residence country. This corresponds to the
current European tax constitution. Section 4 studies investment behavior in two alternative
federal arrangements to curb tax competition: graduate taxes and income-contingent loans.
Both wouldbe paidtothe country whichhas …nanced education, thereby givingthat country
a stake in productivity increases independently of future domicile of its students. Section 4
presents also a calculation of a graduate tax for Finland, as well as discusses administrative
issues and possible synergies in other policy …elds, most notably integrating pension systems
4On the other hand, Kehoe (1989) argues that tax competition may o¤er a way to avoid the time-
consistency problem. Thum and Übelmesser (2001) suggest that labor mobility could increase investment in
education as it serves as a commitment device to low taxation. Chau and Stark (1999) highlight that higher
returns to skills available abroad increase private incentives to invest in those skills.
6and limiting tax evasion. Section 5 elaborates on graduate taxes in connection with the
enlargement of the European Union. Section 6 concludes.
2. Economy without Migration
There are several possible motivations for a government to educate its young citizens. An
altruistic government may educate the young citizens solely in order to increase their future
income. If the government represents the interests of the middle-aged and elderly citizens, it
may still educate the young inorder to increase future productivity ofcomplementary factors
of production, or tax revenue available in the future to …nance pension bene…ts. Even if the
government were not altruistic, it may educate the young citizens in order to be able to
collect more tax revenue from them in the future.
The model is as follows. At the beginning of adulthood, citizens acquire education
provided by the government. The length of education may di¤er across di¤erent programs.
After education has been completed, individuals supply labor services inelastically for their
remaining working life. The government has access to international loan markets with a
given interest rate r. Wage income as well as costs are denoted in net present value terms
using the discount rate r. We denote the ability of a young citizen indexed by i by ai, and
we assume that with education in the …eld j, citizen i0s net present value of lifetime wage
income wi;j depends onhis or her ability andresources devoted to that education, denoted by
ci;j. Assuming unit costs of resources devoted to education, ci;j is also the cost of education
7j given to individual i. Therefore, the net present value of gross wage income is given by:
wi;j = wj(ai;ci;j):
The wage tax rate t is constant. Education may generate external bene…ts to the rest of
society in excess of tax revenue collected from the educated. For example, a larger stock of
human capital would increase the marginal product of complementary factors of production.
In a corporatist labor market, these external e¤ects may also capture the di¤erence between
the marginal product of the educated and their wage rate. With labor unions aiming at
compressing wage distribution, an increase in the marginal productivity of one worker need
not be fully re‡ected in his or her wage rate. Whatever the source of the external bene…ts of
human capital of the educated, apart from future tax revenue from them, their net present
value is captured by:
ei;j = ej(ai;ci;j):
The shadow price of public funds is 1 + „, where „ ¸ 0. The utility function of those
educated is linear in consumption. When the weight of a young citizen to be educated is
denoted by ﬁ;0 · ﬁ · 1; and the weight of external bene…ts is denoted by ﬂ, ﬂ ¸ 0, the
social bene…t as perceived by the government is
b(ai;ci;j) = ﬁ(1 ¡ t)wj(ai;ci;j)+ ﬂej(ai;ci;j) +(1 +„)twj(ai;ci;j):
8Investment in education may be either a discrete or a continuous choice. While I concen-
trate in the general analysis on continuous investments, some proofs simplify by assuming
choices to be discrete. When analyzing continuous investments, I assume that wj and ej are
non-decreasing concave functions. Formally, @
@cwj ¸ 0; @2
@c2wj · 0, @
@cej ¸ 0; @2
@c2ej · 08j.
The social maximization problem is tochoose for eachyoung citizen the type of education










while the resources used to …nance a continuous investment in education are given by
bc = 1+ „8i;j;
where subscript c denotes partial derivative such as bc =
@
@ci;jb(ai;ci;j). With discrete ed-
ucational choices, the solution of the maximization problem of the government concerning
citizen i is given by
j = argmax
k
[b(ai;ci;k) ¡ (1+ „)ci;k)]:
In either case, the government chooses the education for each individual so that the social
surplus of education is maximized. With concave and increasing e and w, the amount of
education provided in any …eld is lower if the government assigns a zero weight on those to
be educated. However, educational investment in some individuals may be higher:
9Proposition 1 A government assigning zero weight to the earnings of those to be educated
may invest more in education than a government assigning a positive weight on the earnings
of those to be educated.
Proof. Assume that there is one individual facing two discrete educational alternatives.
In alternative A, wage income is 10, external bene…ts are 0 and the cost of education is
3. In alternative B, wage income is 7, external bene…ts are 3 and the cost of education is
4. Assume that ﬂ = 1;„ = 0 and t = 0:5. If the government attaches zero weight to the
educated, it perceives the social surplus of education A as 2, and that of B as 2:5. If the
government attaches a weight ﬁ = 1 to the educated, then it perceives the social surplus of
A as 7 and that of B as 6. Thus, a government with ﬁ = 0 chooses more expensive education
B than government with ﬁ = 1.
The counterintuitive result of Proposition 1 arises from the accounting of external bene-
…ts, and it is presented as a theoretical possibility meriting empirical scrutiny. A model with
homogeneous human capital would predict that the investment in human capital is always
increasing in the weight attached to those to be educated.
3. Common Labor Market with Tax Competition
Let us next assume that labor is mobile. Without loss of generality, assume that there are
two member states, labeled 1 and 2. The timing of events is that …rst national governments
invest in the education they provide to their citizens. In the second stage, the educated
citizens choose in which member state they live and work. In the third stage, citizens
10educated in each member state supply labor and pay taxes in the member state they have
chosen to live in.
The wage tax rate is denotedby t for member state 1 and b t for member state 2. I simplify
the analysis by assuming that the wage tax rate is exogenous, in order to concentrate on the
e¤ects of labor mobility on the public provision of education. Allowing the wage tax rate to
vary would strengthen the incentives to cut public …nancing of education, as tax competition
would result in reduced tax revenue, thereby increasing the shadowprice of public funds and
reducingthe returns that thegovernment receives from thosetobe educatedviatax revenues.
The probability for a given individual to emigrate after education is completed depends on
the type of education. While the probability is likely to depend also on the wage tax rate in
the native member state and the wage tax rate in the other member state, these potential
arguments are not written explicitly, as they are treated as exogenous. Furthermore, the
probability of migration could depend on individual ability and the level of resources used
for education, but also these links are omitted for simplicity. The probability of emigration
of individuals with education j, denoted by pj for member state 1 and b pj for member state
2, is therefore exogenous. The social bene…t of education j for individual i in member state
1 as perceived by the government is now
b(ai;ci;j) = (1¡ pj)ﬁ1(1¡ t)w1
j(ai;ci;j)+ pjﬁ2(1¡ b t)w2
j(ai;ci;j)
+(1 ¡ pj)ﬂe1
j(ai;ci;j) +(1 ¡ pj)(1 +„)tw1
j(ai;ci;j);
(1)
in which ﬁ1 (ﬁ2) is the social weight assigned by the government of member state 1 to its
11educated citizen living in member state 1 (2), w1
j(ai;ci;j) (w2
j(ai;ci;j)) is the gross wage in
member state 1 (2) of an individual from member state 1 with ability ai and education j
created using resources ci;j, and e1
j(ai;ci;j) are the external bene…ts of an individual from
member state 1 with ability ai and education j created using resources ci;j when living in
member state 1. All variables related to citizens being educated in the member state 2 are
denoted by "hat", so that, for example, b w1
j(b ai;b ci;j) would be the gross wage of an educated
citizen from member state 2 but living in member state 1. My formulation allows member
states to have di¤erent technologies both in producing and in using humancapital, as well as
emigrants andnatives facing di¤erent wages withsame ability andhumancapital investment.
These could result, for example, from di¤erent language skills. While I present the results
for member state 1, corresponding results can be derived for the other member state simply
by changing the indices. As it is plausible that the government does not care more about
emigrants than citizens staying, I assume that 0 · ﬁ2 · ﬁ1 · 1. Maximizing social surplus
b(ai;ci;j) ¡ (1+ „)ci;j implies:
Proposition 2 If the weight assigned to expatriates is zero, then for any student i resources
used for any potential choice of education j are decreasing in the probability of emigration.















12The claim follows as the right-hand side is constant, and w1
j(ai;ci;j) and e1
j(ai;ci;j) are in-
creasing concave functions with constant positive multipliers. With discrete education, the
government would invest in education j of individual i if b(ai;ci;j) ¡ (1 + „)ci;j ¸ 0. This
holds as long as pj is below a critical value.
If the weight assigned to expatriates is zero and investments in education are continuous,
then an increasing labor mobility of one educational group reduces investment in all citizens
in that group. It may also reduce the size of that group. For example, if the government
was initially indi¤erent, for some individual, between education of type j and education of
type h;h 6= j, then the government strictly prefers education of type h after an increase in
pj. This reduces the size of the group. Surprisingly,
Proposition 3 An increasing labor mobility of some groups may either increase or decrease
total resources used to …nance education even when the weight assigned to expatriates is zero.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the government assigns a positive weight to the expatriates, then an increase in the
probability of emigration may increase the number of citizens receiving that type of educa-
tion, as well as the level of resources used to educate them. This requires that the expatriates
earn a higher net wage abroad than their gross wage and external bene…ts that they might
otherwise generate domestically, and that the government values the utility of expatriates
su¢ciently high. The government would have to be willing to tax the remaining population
to …nance the utility gains of expatriates. This is not likely if the government has to win
13approval from the remaining population. Therefore, it seems more likely that increased la-
bor mobility would induce the government to change the mix of education provided towards
those …elds that bene…t the remaining population. If this is the case, increased labor mobil-
ity would lead into eroded provision of internationally applicable education, like the natural
sciences, engineering, medicine, and economics, and bias the curriculum o¤ered towards
internationally less applicable …elds, like law and humanities with national emphasis.
If the two member states are identical, then labor mobility does not o¤er any e¢ciency
gains, while it may distort investment in education. Therefore, it may either reduce welfare
or leave it unchanged. If the countries di¤er, then the welfare e¤ects of labor mobility may
go either way. If the government attaches a positive weight to the utility of expatriates,
and both member states have a comparative advantage in producing human capital needed
in the other member state, both member states may do so. Labor mobility may increase
social welfare when the two member states are not identical, even when the governments
attach zero weight to expatriates. This can result from mutually bene…cial brain exchange.
For example, the presence of migrants with a di¤erent type of human capital may generate
positive externalities by spreading new ideas and technology. More surprisingly,
Proposition 4 Even when the two member states are identical, an increase in the labor
mobility of one type of human capital may increase social welfare if the other type is already
mobile.
Proof. See Appendix.
14To summarize, the welfare e¤ects of labor mobility may be more complex than one would
expect. An increase in the mobility of one group may either increase or decrease social
welfare in either member state. The reason why an increase in the mobility of labor in one
member state may decrease welfare in the other member state hinges on the policy response
of the government in the member state su¤ering from a higher probability of emigration
of one group. If a further increase in the probability of emigration of an internationally
applicable type of education results in the government in that member state switching to
o¤ering internationally non-applicable education, the other member state su¤ers also as it no
longer receives immigrants and the tax revenue and potential external bene…ts they would
o¤er. Therefore, welfare e¤ects of migration probabilities may be non-monotonic.
4. Federal Alternatives
4.1. Graduate Taxes
Assume next that emigrants pay graduate taxes to the government which initially ed-
ucated them. The net present value of graduate tax payments depends on future income
‡ow.5 While there could be an exempted income below which graduate tax is not collected,
this section concentrates on the case in which a graduate tax is an equal share of income
for all educated. The federally imposed maximum value of the graduate tax rate in member
state 1 (2) is tg (b tg). The simplest case would be where this value would be the same in
each member state, but this need not be the case.6 The general wage tax rate in member
5Already Friedman and Kuznets (1945) suggested …nancing professional education by students selling
shares in their future earnings.
6If there were no restrictions, national governments could adopt con…scatory “graduate taxes”, e¤ectively
15state 1 (2) with graduate taxes is tw (b tw). In order to allow the comparison of social bene…ts
from education with or without graduate taxes also with „ > 0, I assume that tw = t ¡ tg
and b tw = b t ¡ b tg. Otherwise, a change in the aggregate tax burden would a¤ect government
investment in education even without migration. A member state receiving considerable
immigration without much emigration might prefer not to establish graduate taxes, as these
would imply losing part of tax revenue that would otherwise be collected from immigrants.
If a member state …nds it optimal to establish a graduate tax, then it is optimal to establish
the maximal graduate tax rate as this maximizes tax revenue from those citizens emigrating
to the other state. The social bene…t of education j for individual i in member state 1 as
perceived by the government is now
b(ai;ci;j) = (1¡ pj)ﬁ1(1¡ tw ¡ tg)w1
j(ai;ci;j)+ pjﬁ2(1¡ b tw ¡ tg)w2
j(ai;ci;j)
+(1¡ pj)ﬂe1











Proposition 5 If the type of education is …xed for each individual, then the introduction




16The results of Proposition 5 hold also when the other state does not establish a graduate
tax, implying that b tg = 0. Furthermore, the other state also gains from the immigrants it
receives having a higher level of human capital. However, a state introducing a graduate tax
and cutting the ordinary wage tax loses a part of the tax revenue that it earlier collected
from immigrants.
Surprisingly, the imposition of a graduate tax may still reduce social welfare:
Proposition 6 The presence of a graduate tax may reduce e¢ciency.
Proof. See Appendix.
While the introduction of graduate taxes does not always increase welfare, this holds in
a stylized model of only internationally applicable and internationally non-applicable types
of education:
Proposition 7 Allowing member states to levy graduate taxes is welfare improving if there
are two types of education, one internationally applicable and the other internationally non-
applicable.
Proof. See Appendix.
Each member state has to compare e¢ciency gains from levying graduate tax to the
loss of tax revenue from the immigrants from the other member state. Either member state
imposes agraduate tax only if thebene…tsexceed the costs. Themember statewhich initially
loses more tax base to the other member state than it receives always …nds it pro…table to
introduce a graduate tax, even if it would not change its investment in education. If one of
17the member states does not impose a graduate tax, then it would be the one enjoying a net
in‡ow of taxable income from the other member state without a graduate tax. Even though
the possibility of either member state establishing a graduate tax bene…ts both member
states, one member state may abstain from doing so if not compensated for the lost tax gain
from migration.
The proposition can be generalized to a situation in which the government chooses be-
tween an internationally applicable and an internationally non-applicable education for each
citizen. Even though it establishes that the availability of a graduate tax improves the social
welfare in both member states, it need not be a Pareto improvement. If one of the member
states establishes a graduate tax while the other does not, then migrants from the …rst to
the second have to pay taxes to …nance education twice, via a graduate tax to their member
state of origin and via general wage taxes to their member state of residence.
A system with national graduate taxes would respect the subsidiarity principle. Member
states could adopt di¤erent degrees of public participation in education. Depending on
political preferences, member states could adopt for a compulsory graduate tax with wider
income redistribution, or, alternatively, for voluntary contracts in which students would
have to commit to paying a graduate tax in the future in exchange for public …nancing of
education, or opt out and pay their education themselves. Such a voluntary system would
maintain some degree of tax competition, viewed by Brennan and Buchanan (1980) as an
essential mechanism through which a federal structure protects citizens against excessive
taxation by lower-level governments. While voluntary contracts would su¤er to some extent
18from adverse selection problem, such problems could be mitigating by a partial subsidy from
the general tax revenue tothose whoparticipate.7 Graduatetax contracts could becombined
with both privately and publicly provided education, as they could be constructed so that
the government would provide students with avoucher and a student aid scheme inexchange
for signing the contract. Furthermore, governments could o¤er graduate tax contracts also
for nationals from other EU member states.
4.2. Income-contingent Loans
In modernEuropean states, aconsiderable part ofincome transfers e¤ectively smooth tax
payers’ incomes over their active lifetime, instead of redistributing income across individuals.
When bene…ts and taxes are not linked, taxes collected to …nance also this consumption
smoothing are from an individual perspective as distorting as taxes collected to …nance
redistribution. This would not need to be the case. Sørensen (forthcoming) argues that
social insurance which does not redistribute income across individuals should be …nanced by
bene…t taxes in order to ensure e¢ciency, according to the principles developed by Wicksell
(1896), Lindahl (1919) and Musgrave (1939). Building on Fölster (1997), Sørensen suggests
that part of an individual’s wage or social security taxes would be replaced by a mandatory
social security contribution added to his or her individual account. Whenever receiving a
bene…t meant to smooth consumption over active lifetime, like an unemployment bene…t or
a student allocation, this would be subtracted from the balance of the individual account.
7Nerlove (1975) analyzes problems associated with …nancing higher education using income-contingent
loans. Focusing on Yale Tuition Postponement Option, implemented in early 70s, he shows that the conse-
quences of income-contingent loans depended crucially on who participated.
19The balance of individual account would increase at the market rate of interest. At the time
of retirement, a positive balance would be converted into a supplementary annuity, while a
negative balance would be cancelled. There would be a debt ceiling for a negative balance.
This would allow also those su¤ering a long spell of unemployment or illness earlier in their
life a chance to reach a positive balance before retirement. For those with a positive balance
at the end of their working life, their contribution to the individual account would represent
forced saving, rather than distorting taxation.
Certain special aspects of education, mostnotably its externale¤ects onthe restof society
as well as the frontloading of the costs of investment, might call for the establishment of a
separate individual education account. As the costs of some forms of higher education tend
to be very high, adding its …nancing to an ordinary individual account analyzed by Sørensen
would easily lead into those choosing an expensive education to reach a debt ceiling already
during their studies. Therefore, individual accounts either would have to impose so high
a debt ceiling that it would be equivalent to no debt ceiling for many with less expensive
education and lower income, or accept that education would still be …nanced out of general
tax revenue at the margin. With a separate individual education account, students could
borrow from their account to …nance both education and living expenses, and this debt
would then accumulate at the market interest rate. The interest rate used could be that
faced by the government debt, in order to induce governments to invest in education in an
e¢cient manner. Insurance against low incomes could be provided by collecting repayments
only from the income above a certain level until the loan and the interest would be repaid.
20If there would be any remaining debt at the retirement age, it would be cancelled. In return
for the government absorbing the downside risk, a student would have to pay an insurance
premium. This insurance premium would be added to the debt, and could be a certain
fraction of the balance borrowed. Income-contingent loans would also allow di¤erentiating
the prices charged for di¤erent degrees. Financing for expensive degrees o¤ering relatively
low direct monetary returns but judged to be socially valuable, like arts and humanities,
would still call for subsidies from the general tax revenue or cross-subsidies from degrees
with relatively cheap production costs but high private returns, like law.
While an income-contingent loan system would reduce tax distortions for those earning
enough to pay for their accumulated debt, it need not be a socially better alternative than
graduate taxes. If there is a cap on payments by those with high income, this requires
increasing the contribution rate of those with lower income. Therefore, income-contingent
loans would deliver e¤ectively zero marginal tax rates to …nance education inincentive terms
for those earning su¢ciently to repay their whole education, at a cost of higher e¤ective mar-
ginal tax rates for those with lower income. Evaluating the e¢ciency e¤ects depends then on
the relative size and labor supply elasticities of the a¤ected groups, while welfare evaluation
would also have to account for an e¢ciency and equity trade-o¤. Income-contingent loans
and graduate taxes also di¤er in the incentive e¤ects for the government. If those emigrating
are expected to have higher income, then graduate taxes encourage a larger investment in
their human capital than income-contingent loans.
214.3. Calculation for Finland
Finnish government expenditures for universities and student allocations, including hous-
ing allocation, totalled 1.3 billion euros in 2002. When evaluating any proposals for a grad-
uate tax, at most such an amount would have to be collected from those with university
education. The amount collected could be less in case part of education would be …nanced
out of general tax revenue to re‡ect external bene…ts to the rest of society, or if research ex-
penditures ofuniversities would be …nanced separately. Whatever amount wouldbe collected
from university graduates would allow reducing other tax burdens by the same amount. If
the government would …nance all expenditures on higher education and student aid from
those working-age university graduates who earn more than 24,000 euros per year and are
less than 65 years of age then it would have to collect in average 3,800 euros from each of
them.8 To collect such a tax revenue, the graduate tax rate would have to be 16 percent of
income above the ‡oor. If tax cuts would be targeted to all tax payers earning more than
24,000 euros annually and being less than 65 years old, then their marginal wage tax rate
for income above 24,000 euros could be cut by 8.7 percent. In net, a switch to a graduate
tax would then increase the marginal tax rate of the university graduates earning more than
24,000 per year by 7.3 percent, while the marginal wage tax rate of those earning more than
24,000 euros annually without university education would be decreased by 8.7 percent.
While a graduate tax would increase marginal tax rates faced by those with university
8The calculations are based on updated Income Distribution Survey (IDS) at VATT. While the calcula-
tions are only for university education, a graduate tax could be used to …nance also other types of education
given to adults. In that case, tax rates could be di¤erentiated according to the type of education received.
22education, it would reduce the wage tax rate a¤ecting migration decisions. In the example
above, the reduction would be 8.7 percent. As those with university education and subject
to a graduate tax would have to pay the tax independently of their residence, such a tax
would no longer a¤ect migration decisions. The e¤ects on average incomes are much more
moderate. The average wage tax rate of university graduates earning above 24,000 euros
annually would be increased by 3.4 percent, while the average wage tax rate of those without
university education would be reduced by 2.6 percent. In case a graduate tax would be
collected to …nance only student allocations including housing allocation, it would have to
be 4.9 percent of the income exceeding 24,000 euros annually for university graduates below
65 years of age. The general wage tax rate of the same age group could be cut by 2.7 percent
for income above 24,000 euros. The average wage tax rate, including graduate tax, would
increase by 1.1 percent for university graduates, and be reduced by 0.8 percent for those
without university education.
While there is no research about …scal e¤ects of migration for Finland, it is reasonable
to expect the e¤ects for Finland would not di¤er much from those for Denmark. Andersen
(2002) has calculated the …scal e¤ects of emigration for Denmark. The results depend cru-
cially on who migrate, as well as howemigration a¤ects public expenditures. If emigrants are
of average income, then a permanent emigration of less than 4,000 30-year-old Danes would
result in the discounted tax loss of one percent of Danish GDP.9 If public expenditures are
reduced in ratio to migration, then the net loss of one percent of Danish GDP would require
9Future tax revenues are discounted using a two percent interest rate, and then compared with the Danish
GDP in the year 2001.
23an emigration of more than 13,500 30-year-olds. However, if emigration is concentrated to
those with higher education, then its consequences are more drastic. A permanent emigra-
tion of 1,900 30-year-olds with higher education would result in the net loss of one percent of
GDP to the public sector. The average annual emigration from Denmark was 25,000 during
the 1990s, of whom 10,000 were 25 to 39 years old. However, half of emigrants returned
within two years, and 80 percent returned within ten years. Emigration from Finland has
increased during the 1990s, reaching 14,000 in 2001. Of Finnish emigrants over the 1990s,
about 60 percent returnedwithin 10 years. (Statistics Finland 2002, Pirttilä and Rajakangas
2002) In 2001, 5.8 percent of Finnish working-age doctors and 5.0 percent of nurses lived
abroad. (Vaalgamaa and Ohtonen 2002) Emigrants tend to be those with the most recently
completed education. Of the 1,038 members of the Union of Health Professionals who em-
igrated in 2001, 150 had completed education in 2000 or 2001. The share of the members
of the Finnish Association of Graduates in Economics and Business Administration (SEFE)
living abroad is 4 percent. (Oksanen 2002)
4.4. Administrative Issues and Synergies
The implementation of graduate taxes or income-contingent loans requires that all mem-
ber states of the federation collect tax revenue or loan repayment also for the other member
states. This would call for a creation of a European tax payer identity number, as well as
exchanging information between member states. A European tax payer identi…cation num-
ber could be constructed from existing national social security numbers by adding a country
code in front of them, and deciding that the …rst social security number received with its
24initial country code would serve as the European tax payer identi…cation number also in
case of changing nationality. Alternatively, immigrants from another member state could
still receive a new social security number in their new country of residence, with obligations
from the previous country being automatically transferred to the new account.
Investment in thecompatible infrastructure betweentax authorities of the di¤erent mem-
ber states and establishment of a European tax payer identi…cation number would simulta-
neously be an investment to limit the e¤ect of “…scal termites”. While the current e¤ects
on tax revenue would seem to be small, certain aspects of globalization and new technology
may be “busily gnawing at the foundations of the tax systems”. (Tanzi 2000). Favorable tax
treatment to key personnel may be an example of such a termite, and increasing numbers
of those working abroad another as it provides more opportunities to conceal income than
working in only one state. By removing the …nancing of higher education from taxation
a¤ecting migration decisions, graduate taxes or income-contingent loans would reduce the
pressure to introduce preferential tax regimes.
Introducing a European tax payer identi…cation number would o¤er synergies with es-
tablishing portable pensions across EU member states, as well as in limiting tax evasion. If
pension rules penalize changing a …rm or state, then they impose implicit barriers to the
free mobility of labor. The subsidiarity principle and free mobility could be combined by
requiring that pension bene…ts would be accumulated in each member state as a separate
incremental entitlement for each year or month. These entitlements to future pensions would
then be recorded using European tax payer identi…cation numbers with an annual basis, in-
25cluding information on when and under what conditions the bene…t can be claimed. The
same European tax payer identi…cation number could also be used to exchange informa-
tion on labor and capital income earned in di¤erent member states, thereby limiting the
possibilities for tax evasion.
5. EU Enlargement and Graduate Tax - A Triple Dividend?
The gap in living standards between the current EU states and the applicant countries
has generated fear that migration would put current welfare systems under severe pressure.
This has resulted in plans to limit migration from the newmember states during a transition
period. Such restrictions, however, also threaten potential e¢ciency gains from migration.
Sinn (1994) has suggested that individuals should be free to choose between competing
welfare systems only when young, and then remain in the same system independently of
their future residence. The argument relies on the interpretation of the welfare state as
an insurance mechanism for those lifetime career risks which cannot be insured privately.
When this is the case, free mobility between di¤erent welfare systems involving ex post
redistributionwould undermine the insurance that these provide ex ante when future income
realizations are still uncertain. Richter (2002) suggests as an alternative the Principle of
Delayed Integration, in which migrants would be reassigned from the income redistribution
system in their previous state to that in their new state after a delay. Such a rule is a
compromise between the Origin or Home Country Principle advocated by Sinn (1994) and
the current Employment Principle, in which citizens are assigned to the tax and welfare
systems based on where they work.
26While the e¤ects of potential immigration to the current member states has received wide
attention, the e¤ects of emigration on the prospective new member states has been by and
large ignored. However, there are several reasons to expect that the e¤ects of migration,
if widespread, could be much more severe at the origin of migration ‡ows. First of all, it
is plausible that a disproportionate share of emigrants would be those who are young and
talented. A haunting possibility is that prospective new member states could react to the
perceived threat of brain drain by investing too little in the human capital of prospective
emigrants, especially by underinvesting in their language skills. Admittedly, they would
have no incentives to stop investment in language skills completely due to their importance
also in the domestic production and international trade. However, sub-optimal investment
in human capital of prospective emigrants and a resource loss for the new member states
due to brain drain would coexist with extensive agricultural and regional subsidies from the
current member states. The introduction of graduate taxes in the new member states could
o¤er a triple dividend, bene…ting the emigrants, those left behind in the new member states
and the old member states alike. By giving the country of origin a stake also in productivity
gains created by emigrants elsewhere, a system of graduate taxes would encourage new
member states to invest more e¢ciently also in internationally applicable human capital.
Emigrants would bene…t by receiving a better and more suitable education, enhancing their
chances in the old member states in which their productivity could be several times higher.
Those left behind could reap returns on human capital investment in the form of graduate
tax payments from well-educated emigrants. They could also bene…t more extensively from
27brain exchange. With more e¢cient human capital investments, those returning would be
even more productive. Finally, the old member states would bene…t by receiving better
educated immigrants. By transferring resources to the new member states, graduate tax
payments could also reduce the need for other transfers.
6. Conclusion
The European model of social protection is under severe pressure. The member states
of the European Union face incentives to cut welfare bene…ts and wage taxes in order to
deter poor migrants and attract those with high incomes. Member states may free-ride by
attracting skilled migrants with low taxes instead of paying for expensive education. This
renders the …nancing of internationally applicable education less attractive for individual
member states. In this paper, I suggest introducing graduate taxes or income-contingent
loans, paid according to the same rules independently of future domicile. Implementing
either would call for a European tax payer identi…cation number, which could also be used
to limit tax evasion. A system of graduate taxes or income-contingent loans should be based
on voluntary contracts, in order to protect citizens against a possibility of excessive taxation
by rent-seeking governments. Even though a part of the students would opt out, this would
not threaten the system. By paying their own education, those opting out would not impose
any burden on those signing the contract. Voluntary contracts would also enjoy a greater
legitimacy than subjecting citizens, even in case of permanent emigration, to an unescapable
tax burden on the basis of where they were born.
Graduate taxes or income-contingent loans could be a part of a wider reform to combine
28in appearance con‡icting aims of free mobility, the subsidiarity principle, the maintenance of
social protection and a reduction of tax burden. Richter (2002) argues in favor of the Prin-
ciple of Delayed Integration, in which migrants would be transferred from one redistribution
system to another after a period of transition. Fölster (1997) and Sørensen (forthcoming)
suggest that part of individual’s wage or social security taxes would be replaced by a manda-
tory social security contribution added to his or her mandatory individual savings account,
used then to …nance bene…ts smoothing consumption before retirement. According to the
Principle of Delayed Integration with Individual Accounts, the balance of individual savings
accounts should be transferable between countries. During the transition period, bene…ts
and payments would be made according to the rules of the country of origin. After the
transition period, the remaining balance would be transferred into the new system. Again,
it would seem optimal to have a separate account for education. While a general account
would be used to …nance consumption smoothing over lifetime, an income-contingent loan to
…nance education or a graduate tax contract would rather resemble a joint venture between
a student and a government providing for public education. Giving member states also a
stake in e¢ciency gains earned elsewhere would encourage governments to invest more in
human capital bene…ting also the other member states, and would favor the emergence of a
genuine European market for higher education.
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Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proposition 2 already shows that increasing labor mobility may reduce investment in
education. To provethat also the contrary is possible, assume that all citizens areof the same
ability type and there are two educational …elds, A and B. For simplicity, the educational
investments are discrete, there are no external bene…ts, ﬁ1 = 1, ﬁ2 = 0, 0 < t < 1, and
„ = 0. The costs and net present values of gross wage income are given by cA = 1, w1
A = 5,
cB = 2; and w1
B = 5. If neither group is mobile, the government chooses education A. If
pA = 0:25 and pB = 0, the government prefers to invest in the more expensive education B
as this o¤ers a higher expected surplus.
Proof of Proposition 4
Assume that all citizens are of the same ability type with cA = 1, w1
A = w2
A = 5,
cB = 2, w1
B = w2




B = 0, t = b t = 0:5, ﬁ1 = ﬁ2 = 1 and
„ = 0. The same holds symmetrically for the other member state. If pA = b pA = 0:25 and
pB = b pB = 0, then both governments prefer to invest in the more expensive education B as
this o¤ers a higher expected surplus. Taking both emigration and immigration into account,
30the expected surplus per citizen to be educated is 3 in both member states. Assume next
that pA = b pA = 0:25 and pB = b pB = 0:25. Now both member states switch to education A,
resulting in the expected surplus of 4 per citizen to be educated in both member states.
Proof of Proposition 5























The …rst-order condition with graduate taxes is, by (2), t = tw + tg, and b tw = b t¡b tg:
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j are all assumed to be non-decreasing concave functions, this
31implies an increase in ci;j as a result of a graduate tax when pj > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6.
Assume that in both member states, all citizens are of the same ability type and there
are two types of education, each requiring a discrete investment. To allow straightforward
comparisons of e¢ciency, assume that „ = 0, ﬁ1 = ﬁ2 = ﬂ = 1. Then each government
maximizes the sum of disposable income and tax revenue of initial domestic citizens. The
wage tax rate is 0.5 in both member states without a graduate tax and it is replaced by
a general wage tax rate of 0.4 and a graduate tax rate of 0.1 in case of a graduate tax.
w1
A = w2
A = 9:75, w1
B = w2
B = 10, cA = cB = 1, e1
A = e1
B = e2
B = 0, e2
A = 2, pA = 0:15,
pB = 0:2; and similarly for the other member state with the exception that b e2
A = 0 and
b e1
A = 2. Note that education of type A results in positive externality in the other member
state, while there are no other external e¤ects. Without graduate tax, both governments
invest in education A and with a graduate tax, in B. Taking external e¤ects from migration
into account, the expected utility of both governments is higher without graduate tax.
Proof of Proposition 7.
Analyzing the decision problem of member state 1, assume …rst that the other state
does not introduce a graduate tax. Then member state 1 introduces a graduate tax only
if it increases its welfare. Assume next that member state 2 introduces a graduate tax. If
member state 1 does not introduce a graduate tax and keeps investment in education the
same, then it gains if member state 2does not reduce investment ininternationally applicable
education. There are two potential sources of gain. First of all, if member state 2 increases
32its investment in internationally applicable education, then member state 1 receives more
human capital, generating higher tax revenues and potentially external bene…ts. Secondly,
the expatriates from member state 1 earn higher after-tax income in member state 2 when
it reduces its general wage tax rate by the amount of the graduate tax. It is never pro…table
to reduce investment in education when introducing the graduate tax compared with not
introducing it. The reason for this is that when introducing the graduate tax, member state
1 gains (1 + „ ¡ ﬁ2)tgw2
j from its expatriates living in the other member state now paying
the graduate tax. By ﬁ2 · 1 this is always positive, implying that the presence of graduate
tax increases returns to investment in internationally applicable education, while leaving
returns to investment in internationally non-applicable human capital unchanged. The same
argument holds for member state 2.
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